The Petty/Bone RCT

Absolutely and I certainly hope you are willing to do so. Let’s contrast the above aspirin for sepsis trial with the BALANCE trial and then discuss how to avoid the pitfall of the PettyBone RCT mod.

Note the the Aspirin for Sepsis Trial (PettyBone) RCT uses a first triage non-disease specific threshold set of SOFA to capture a second set of different diseases (which are lumped as the synthetic syndrome of “Sepsis”) and then Aspirin is tested using this PettyBone RCT mod. purporting to generate a **single average treatment effect (ATE) of aspirin on this second set of different diseases. (This is generally the way that sepsis and ARDS RCT have been done for 36 years, since Bone’s failed methylprednisolone for SIRS trial in 1989. They have not been reproducible.)

    1. Sepsis was defined according to the Sepsis-3 definition by the presence of a suspected or confirmed infection and an increase in the SOFA score of two points or more.”
    1. “Patients in the ASA group received 200 mg orally or enterally once a day for 7 days, regardless of ICU discharge.”

Contrast that to the BALANCE trial

  • "1. Patients were eligible for enrollment if they were admitted to a participating hospital at the time a blood culture was reported as positive with a pathogenic bacterium…A full list of inclusion and exclusion criteria is provided in Table S2.

  • 2. Adequate was defined as antibiotic therapy to which the organism was susceptible according to local laboratory reports;"

Not not only was there an objective diagnosis in the BALANCE (bacteremia) but the treatment was specific to the diagnosis.

So the pitfall is avoided by having a diagnosis or specific measurable targetable homogenous thread in all the patients in the RCT. A set of non-disease specific thresholds, such as SIRS, Sepsis 3 (which is SOFA), or the next threshold set generated by the next Sepsis or ARDS consensus task forces simply cannot do that.

One could argue that BALANCE should have separated the organisms and performed a separate RCT on each and this would have been more in keeping with Bradford Hill’s method. Certainly they had 74 centers so this would have been preferred. As it is we are left wondering if certain more resistant pathogens might not fall within the ATE. In a sense n is artificially high for each specific organism. Yet this RCT mod is profoundly better than a PettyBone RCT mod.

Great to have a discussion. How do you perceive these two RCT mods in comparison with Bradford Hill’s and Fisher’s teachings? Do you agree with my analysis here? What are your views or the next step? Do you think that lumping by non-disease specific threshold set might eventually reveal a common thread?

I look forward to the discussion. I hope others will also contribute.

@Elias_Eythorsson

Just sending this in case you missed my response to your request for an honest discussion of the comparison of the PettyBone RCT and the Balance trial.

I think many are looking forward to your response and thoughts as this is a very timely and popular thread and topic.

Corrected reply above should be to @Elias_Eythorsson

I don’t think @Elias_Eythorsson is coming back for that “honest discussion” since it’s been over 3 weeks but maybe he will. @ESMD and @Doc_Ed both denigrated and summarily bolted. That was not surprising.

I will summarize this thread:

First: By deep review of the history, I identified the 1967 and 1989 combined apical error of a pathological science. This error was the RCT modification called the PettyBone RCT which eliminated the need to diagnose a disease and replaced the diagnostic process with a first set of guessed thresholds to lump (by triage), a second set of different diseases for this new modified RCT.

Second: I showed that this RCT mod is pathological science which has not rendered reproducibly positive results for 35 years despite hundreds of such RCT. Furthermore a one-size-fits-all standard ventilator protocol based on this pathological science caused great harm during the pandemic. This protocol has been abandoned.

This proved that pathological medical science is not only wasteful of money and careers but is harmful to the public.

In any other industry the discovery of a fixable apical error would be an exciting revelation causing action for reform. I was the first to discover that the specific source of the lack of reproducibility of critical care RCT was the modification of the Bradford Hill methodology and, even if unrecognized now, this was a great discovery for the science of critical care.

Indeed critical care scientists have long blamed raw generalized heterogeneity for the failure but failed to go back in history to seek the source. For this reason they failed to see that thier past leaders Petty and Bone had integrated profound heterogeneity into their modified RCT methodology itself by lumping different diseases using a guessed threshold set as triage.

Massive excitement would have been generated in industry responsive to the discovery of a fundamental methodological cause of decades of waste and failure because it would be seen as an amazing opportunity for a new direction and greater productivity.

My father, a chemical engineer in the 1950s, discovered a source of waste in the processing of aluminum. His work was hailed.

In contrast, my discovery of a fixable, apical source of waste in medical science triggered insults and denigration. No one argued it was not pathological science (they could not). Rather they simply did not like the promulgation of it.

I recall this same thing happened to a prominent thought leader (who later was president of the ACCP). She presented evidence over a decade ago at a national meeting that the AHi was not a gold standard for severity of sleep apnea. Rather than being praised for her work and insight, she was accused from the lectern of “euthanizing children”. This public denigration, of course, was said as “tongue in cheek” but it was also a shot across the bow warning her not to disrupt the flow of the spice.

Likewise the denigrating response in this thread to my discovery of the historical onset and source of decades of waste as a function pathological modification of RCT methodology shows that scientists cannot be trusted to police themselves just as they could not be trusted to police the severity standard for sleep apnea.

Any challenge to deep decades old dogma which is rendering a river of grants Is perceived as a challenge to “mother science”. This is why they become verbally denigrating and then quickly run away.

It’s fine to end this thread now but the results of this experiment have made me realize that the “threshold set guessing task forces” must be defunded by the new NIH.

We must cut off the source of the PettyBone RCT mod. or they will simply stay the course.

Without the first guessed threshold set (which , believe it or not, the task force reconvenes to guess anew every decade) this pathological RCT mod will collapse because they won’t have a standard means to triage the patients (to lump the different diseases) for the RCT. They must then turn to the teachings of Bradford Hill and study each disease separately or find a homogeneous thread to identify those included. At the same time the NIH defunds the threshold guessing task forces, the NIH should liberally fund the reform.

Unless anyone has a prolog, goodby all.

This social experiment was fully supportive of my original hypothesis which states:

Scientists will generally seek to discredit any effort which impedes a well established flow of grant funding without regard to the merit of the research.

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To reiterate something I said earlier, let’s move towards continuing the discussion with an emphasis on designing future trials.

Very well. The discussion is too important to abandon. Positive, forward looking only.

Here is this weeks discussion of how to solve the RCT failure problem in critical care from the International Symposium on Intensive Care and Emergency Medicine (ISICEM) in Brussels, Belgium.

Note the discussion of “pathways” AND identifying the cause or biological mechanism of death in synthetic syndromes if mortality is an endpoint, the goal being to determine treatment effect to prevent certain mechanisms of death.

A second point is the variability of treatment effect as a function of timing along the times series matrix of data where treatment may cause harm at one point along the TSM and benefit at another.

Lacking in the discussion are the statistical considerations here.

So a question for the group is, assuming a comprehensive DAG is created, how would a statistician approach these issues. Would the overarching consideration be to assure a measurable common thread and a causal link to the mechanism of death?

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Just published was one of the most shocking divergent results in acute care medicine, the REMAP-CAP “RCT”, testing of hydrocortisone for severe community acquired pneumonia. The results included a 14.4% probability of benefit and an 85.6% probability of harm.

This despite most of the previous trials including CAPE COD found benefit, including a meta analysis. Worse, the standard protocol based on the previous RCT calls for giving corticosteroids so this is a stunning rebuttal of prior RCT by the highly touted REMAP CAP. You will notice an interesting spin when you read the discussion because this result is profoundly shocking to those who actually thought REMAP CAP was a valid RCT.

Most in the field are shocked and the ripple is felt in social media. However those who have read this thread could have predicted this result as REMAP CAP is a PettyBone RCT which is not really an RCT but rather an “RCT mimic”. (A wide range of different diseases are lumped together under the criteria including a range of viral and bacterial pneumonia)

REMAP CAP is the most ambitious PettyBone RCT platform in history. COViD was separated out in one study so it has spun out a real RCT.

Nevertheless there is no getting around that REMAP-CAP is an RCT mimic. Bradford Hill did not allow the lumping of many different diseases tested together with a single intervention in a single RCT, he taught the opposite so this is an “RCT mimic”. It looks like an RCT but it does not have the pivotal features of an RCT.

(The problem here is not DoE, because this is not a real RCT in the first instance.)

So what could have been done to render a real RCT. The answer is to perform individual RCT on each disease separately. Sure they could be in the same platform but you can’t lump them for an RCT. Sure that’s more difficult but it can be done with large multicenter trials.

In contrast this PettyBone disease lumping shortcut renders an RCT mimic which, although it is easier, actually renders a falsely high true n for each disease in the mix.

This marks another failed PettyBone RCT in a 30 plus year history of failed PettyBone RCT with many protocols reverted due to harm. The public deserves action to eliminate RCT mimics by defining a standard setting the features which must be present to qualify as a real RCT.

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Could you provide a link to the study? I’d like to take a look at it. Perhaps we could discuss it in a separate thread.

Having no intuition or experience in this particular area, I’d be concerned with automatically granting this most recent study higher credibility than the prior studies (even acknowledging your valid criticisms of methodological issues related to definition of these medical conditions).

It would seem there are severe problems with the measurement/data generation process in critical care clinical trials. This calls into question the sampling models for the experiments, and the trustworthiness of the reported statistics. Despite that, there is still reason to believe something can be learned, even if it is only to design better experiments.

Following the guidelines discussed in the following thread on meta-analysis, I would focus on identifying sources of heterogeneity using meta-regression if data permitted it.

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Very well. I can start another thread. Probably a good idea. Will copy to there.

Here is the URL to the REMAP CAP

and link to PDF

Here is the link to CAPE COD

And to the Cochrane meta analysis

This is a very important question in acute care as these severe pneumonia patients are often otherwise quite healthy.

RCT Reproducibly has been very low in the conditions of sepsis and ARDS. We thought that in Community acquired pneumonia (CAP) the signal was fairly strong. Yet CAP is a mixture of many very different diseases. For instance methicillin resistant staph aureus pneumonia is markedly different clinically from Pneumococcal pneumonia and even pathophysiologically removed from influenza A pneumonia. These are all mixed under CAP.

I look forward to your thoughts. Right now I’m not sure whether to prescribe hydrocortisone or not in this setting.

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Looking forward, I present the steps in this brief You Tube video for returning to the once proud culture of self-policing and self-correction of the science of experimentation in critical care. .

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Today’s lecture’s at the American Thoracic Society meeting in San Francisco.

See the copied tweets wherein the problem is identified as SEPSIS and ARDS are recognized as the “graveyard of pharmacotherapy” in today’s ATS lecture.

However, the proposed solution is to bypass RCT derived ATE and go to individual treatment effects. (I’m not sure how one does that).

They don’t seem to realize they have added an entire extra layer of heterogeneity as a function of the captured target disease mix by using disease agnostic guessed thresholds as triage for RCT participants.

We need to teach them that it is this second layer which is the problem as it was not part of a Bradford Hill RCT and Fisher did NOT sow a species agnostic mix of different seed types.

https://x.com/atscritcare/status/1924864771637330225?s=46

https://x.com/atscritcare/status/1924870975449116791?s=46

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Looking forward and seeking a solution hypothesis to the present critical care research crisis highlighted by the recent REMAP CAP, what are the thoughts of adding symbolic causal modeling with DAGs or some other such symbolic method as a requirement for funding of an RCT?

On X I provided the evidence that comparison of DAGS would have revealed a disparate block of the arrow from immune suppression to increased bacterial load AUC (in the time domain) vs viral load AUC. (AUC here refers to the viral or bacterial load over time)

Past (and present) oversimplified analysis is that immunosuppression induced by treatment of community acquired pneumonia with corticosteroids would reduce injurious inflammation in both bacterial and viral pneumonia. Based on this simplified view researchers think they can lump both community acquired bacterial and viral under the synthetic syndrome of Community acquired pneumonia (CAP). It is this type of oversimplified thinking with no formal casual modeling (eg no DAGs) which has dominated in critical care clinical experimentation science. However these studies have not been reproducible for decades.

Here are some quotes from X. First from Grok to show the two edged scalpel of corticosteroids.

“Mechanism: Corticosteroids suppress the immune system by reducing inflammation and cytokine production, which can impair the body’s ability to clear viral infections like influenza. This suppression may prolong viral shedding, especially in the lungs.”

Now think about what you know about antivirals vs antibiotics. You may not know that Antivirals are quite unreliable but antibiotics are quite reliable for a broad range of community acquired viral and bacterial pulmonary pathogens, many of which are deadly.

Now draw two DAGs one for viral pneumonia and one for bacterial pneumonia.

Note the sequential arrows from corticosteroids (C) to immunosuppression (I) to increased viral AUC (V) to increased mortality (M) .

C → I → V → M

Note in the bacterial DAG that the analogous sequential arrows from corticosteroids to immunosuppression to increased bacterial AUC (B) to increased mortality is blocked by antibiotics at the

C-> I → [blocked] B-> M

This shows the pitfall of substituting a hypothesis for formal causal modeling. Obviously you can’t lump these pneumonia (as they did in REMAP CAP) in a disease agnostic RCT as the % mix of viral vs bacterial pneumonia would affect the ATE rendering multiple RCT non-reproducible.

The disparate effects of the antibiotics vs antivirals blocking vs not blocking respectively, the increased AUC of the pathogen count in the time domain is something that was overlooked.

Comparison of the two DAGS discloses this. This would have been warning enough to simply do the viral RCT separate from the bacterial RCT. Indeed the viruses will need to be separated as we learned to our sorrow that lumping severe COViD pneumonia into ARDS ventilator protocols (as had been done with influenza pneumonia) resulted in significant harm on a worldwide scale before the critical care docs at the bedside revolted. A deeper understanding of all of this might have prevented the idea that COViD pneumonia could just be lumped in. In other words the culture of blind lumping of different diseases by guessed threshold set triage would have been eliminated by self correction of science long ago.

Of course even these DAGs are oversimplified but they are perfectly illustrative. These DAGs are easy to do but they require a depth of knowledge of the potentially relevant physiology which brings the statistician and PI into a deeper discussion of constraining physiological paths.

Here a marked difference is easy to see with these DAGs but easily missed without them. The formalization of causal modeling, as opposed to the standard worded gestalt, is the process required to assure the public’s funds are well spent and potential harms which may be hidden by lumping are well defined.

We are so careful with formal processes to prevent “Swiss cheese” penetrating mistakes in the hospital. We should apply the same formal protections to the process of research design.

The synergy between formal symbolic causal modeling and RCT disclosed the subtle Langmuir apical error which had been missed for decades and which rendered those RCT as pathological experimentation science.

Now consider an RCT for corticosteroids for septic shock which is defined by a guessed threshold set and comprised lumping at a supermassive scale with hundreds of different infections treated with antibiotics, anti fungal and antivirals lumped by a guessed threshold set in standardized (mandated for grants) PettyBone sepsis RCTs.

The many DAGs which would have been required to determine if the lumping of these different infections for testing a single treatment using a RCT was valid would have shown that these lumping RCT would NOT expected to be reproducible.

Some may call a massively lumping (PettyBone) RCT a decades old standardized pathological design of experiment but I call it a “RCT mimic” because it should not have the purple robes of a real RCT which fooled ALL of us and the RCT facade is still fooling most critical care science leaders and grant reviewers who decide the fundable standard research methodology of the field.

(At one time back in the 20th century we were all fooled because they were labeled as RCT)

Here you see formal causal modeling is a means to add much needed rigor to help determine the DoE. Had causal modeling been required to acquire the grants in critical care in the past, it might have saved critical care science decades of wasted research and careers and massive wasted resources and unnecessary patient harm. Even if the approach is Bayesian the same symbolic causal modeling would be required.

So there was a desire to move to solutions. This of course is only a “solution hypothesis”. What do others think of this proposed solution to improve critical care experimentation science.

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Lawrence- props for trying to look forward with this last post, but I don’t think DAGs are going to solve critical care’s problems.

It seems that there are three main stumbling blocks here: 1) physiologic heterogeneity; 2) therapeutic efficacy (which, in turn, will be a function of biologic plausibility); and 3) trial logistics. Unless all of these barriers are overcome, progress won’t happen. All are wicked problems.

Re 1): In order for a trial to stand any chance of revealing a therapy’s intrinsic efficacy (if present), a certain minimum degree of physiologic homogeneity among trial subjects will be needed. But physiologic homogeneity can be defined in innumerable ways, as Dr.Palmer pointed out earlier in this thread. There will be countless ways to draw rings around groups of patients to decide which ones are “similar enough” that they should be enrolled in the same trial- indeed, this seems like the “holy grail” of critical care research. It’s abundantly clear to all readers that you disagree with the critical care community’s ring-drawing efforts to date. But there’s also no doubt, as noted by Dr.Palmer, that researchers around the world are working very hard to tackle this problem. I anticipate and acknowledge your disagreement on this point, but let’s try to move past it, since you’ve already expressed this view six ways from Sunday.

Re 2): Efficacious therapies will only be found if the search is grounded in compelling biologic plausibility. Disagreements around biologic plausibility have been key pain points for trials to date and need to be addressed before embarking on any trial.

Given the plethora of options for ring-drawing, we will always question whether we have drawn the “correct” rings around groups of patients when enrolling for a trial, even if experts can agree on a sensible intervention to test. As a result, we will always be left wondering whether the reason a trial failed to show efficacy was because of flawed ring-drawing or absence of intrinsic therapeutic efficacy. We are trying to solve an equation with too many unknowns. Sometimes, therapies that could be efficacious in unrecognized subsets of patients will end up getting discarded simply because of bad ring-drawing.

Re 3): Over the past few years, trial machinery has been developed that might give researchers the ability to enrol more granularly-defined groups of patients. This is encouraging. Recruiting enough trial subjects with “homogeneous enough” (however that is defined) physiology for a trial to detect a reliable efficacy signal (if one is present) is going to require international co-operation.

Here’s a challenge for you (this is what I meant by “moving things forward” many posts ago)- these are the hard and very specific questions that can’t be avoided. Let’s say that NIH hadn’t just been decimated and you’re the primary investigator for a large critical care trial, with the ability to recruit patients from around the world. You’ve decided that you want to draw a ring around patients who are critically ill with an E.Coli infection. Here’s where the rubber meets the road and it’s up to you to address the following questions:

  1. How you will you identify which patients should be deemed eligible for your trial in a timely enough way to test your therapy? Specifically, please discuss the mechanics/timing of identification of E.Coli infection relative to the timing of patient presentation and timing of the intervention you might want to test. Would you enrol patients with E.Coli infection stemming from a bowel perforation or a UTI or fecal-oral transmission, or just one of these sources- why? Also, how will you define “critically ill”? In other words, when will patients be “too sick” or “not sick enough” to be enrolled in your trial?;
  2. How will you define your outcomes of interest?;
  3. How long do you estimate that it will it take you to recruit enough patients to generate a sufficient number of outcomes of interest (you might need to consider how long it has taken previous trials to recruit a given number of critically ill patients with E.Coli infection)?;
  4. Which therapy will you test, and why?;
  5. If your trial is “positive,” will you need to then do another trial to show whether your findings can be extrapolated to all patients infected with gram negative bacteria? Or will you need to do a trial for each gram negative organism (e.g., Klebsiella, Pseudomonas,…)? Why or why not? Will you have enough money to run all these trials, and how long will they take? And finally
  6. If your trial doesn’t identify efficacy of the intervention, what will you do next? Will you continue to test the same therapy in future trials, drawing ever-smaller rings around patients (e.g., enrolling only those with E.Coli from a urinary source or enrolling patients who are more sick or less sick?…)? OR will you abandon the therapy and move on to the next therapeutic candidate, again running the trial just in patients infected with E.Coli? OR will you abandon the therapy in patients infected with E.Coli, but then test it in patients infected with Klebsiella or Pseudomonas infections? How much is all this going to cost, and who will fund all your trials?

Another family practice metaphor: If I have a patient who is suffering significant health consequences from sub-optimal habits (e.g., poor diet, too much alcohol), I won’t help him just by yelling at him, over and over “You’re doing everything wrong, look how sick you’ve made yourself!!” He will shut down and stop listening. I will need to put in the time and effort, through multiple long conversations, to understand all the drivers for his choices (e.g., poverty, social isolation, depression, marital conflict, suboptimal understanding of health risks). In the process, I might come to realize that, in some ways, he’s doing the best that he can with the hand that he’s been dealt and that I don’t have all the solutions either. And only by acknowledging the scope of his challenges and humbling myself in front of them, will I get him to hear me, not just listen to me. And only then will I stand any chance of helping him to make progress toward solutions. Effortful good faith engagement always yields better results than criticism.

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Hi Erin. Welcome back to this thread.

Yes you are right that I disagreed with the “circle around” sepsis which was nothing but a set of non disease specific thresholds guessed by Roger Bone in 1989 called SIRS but mandated as triage to select participants of “Sepsis RCTs”. I wrote a letter to the editor predicting its failure.

In 2016 they synthetically shifted the paradigm and drew a new circle with another set of diseases captured by another set of guessed thresholds called SOFA (which they renamed as Sepsis 3) which was guessed by Vincent in 1996. I was there when they announced it. Perhaps one thousand docs from all over the world, head down writing the guessed thresholds down. Very sad.

Of course I objected to that. Interestingly it did not contain a single signal that was in the old standard set of thresholds (SIRS) for RCT participant triage for 25 years of non-reproducible RCT. Of course a decade later they may draw a new circle by guessing again a new set of non disease specific thresholds with which to triage participants given the failure of Sepsis 3.

As a critical care doc I was always intrigued by those who argued for the status quo when the aforementioned status was clearly failing. We don’t save the dying outliers with that type of thinking. We ask the team to deeply introspect as a group assuming all of our assumptions are wrong. We pull up anchor and start over. That’s how you save the life of a patient dying on protocol. That’s how you approach 35 years of lived RCT failure in sepsis.

So rather than telling us why symbolic causal modeling prior to an RCT design will not improve RCT design, tell us why the two simple DAGs (one for influenza A pneumonia and one for pneumococcal pneumonia) which I drew in the prior comment, do not warn that there was danger, potential harm, and potential non-reproducibility associated with lumping them in a synthetic syndrome (CAP) RCT testing the efficacy/harm of hydrocortisone treatment.

Lawrence- with respect, you’re still stuck. The DAGs don’t actually solve any concrete problem- they’re simply a restatement of points you’ve made many times before.

You’re absolutely convinced that nobody but you understands the pitfalls of lumping. Dr.Palmer said, unambiguously, that you’re mistaken and that this is a widely understood problem in critical care research. I believe him- he’s doing a PhD in this stuff. A more plausible explanation for why study design isn’t yet reflecting what is apparently widespread knowledge is that nobody has identified an alternate approach that’s both methodologically valid and logistically feasible. As Ed said, these are really hard problems to solve from a design standpoint, with constant tension between the imperatives of pragmatism and methodologic “purity.” You’re yelling at colleagues to stop throwing spaghetti at the wall, but you’re not telling them what to do instead

Can you take a stab at questions 1-6 in my post?…There’s no shame in admitting that you’re not sure how you’d proceed. Arguably, this would be the most honest answer. But if this is the case, then I hope that you might feel compelled to use your deep expertise to work with (rather than against) colleagues to actually tackle these intractable problems. Have you ever had an in-depth conversation with a researcher who’s contemplating designing a modern critical care trial? If not, why not? If yes, how did it go? Alienating researcher colleagues who are already likely feeling very frustrated (after running repeatedly into brick walls) won’t advance your cause. Flogging people with a list of things they’ve been doing wrong doesn’t necessarily illuminate their path forward…

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Oh Erin. Control yourself. You have turned this into a personal attack because you have nothing to offer.

You left the thread in the past with insult and fanfare. My advice is to avoid ad hominem and quietly show yourself out.

There are many other threads here for your interest.

Sorry Lawrence, sometimes we women just can’t help ourselves. Must be all the hormones :roll_eyes: Hope you’ll get better feedback from others on the site.

No apology necessary Erin. I was too blunt.

I will acknowledge to being subtly brutal with my dying patient analogy.

I have for years benefited from your thoughtful comments here at Datamethods. When I get time I’ll address your E. coli question.

Medical science is not easy for those who care. Warm Regards.

It’s not a personal attack. The issue with too much repetition is real.

Very well Dr. Harrell. I thought the repetitive published lumping failed RCT (of which I cited 3 in the last 3 months), including the failed REMAP CAP was mitigating, and evidence enough that crit care science was still in the box and needed convincing.

Erin, relevant the eColi infection. I dont accept your paradigm of racing off with RCT. We have many such cases analyzed and archived and I can tell you that
You missed the first step:

“Study each disease and the relational time series patterns of each disease”

Begin by collecting time series data from thousands of such cases from EMR archives to develop analytics to detect the lab, vitals and pharm, cultures, PCR, time series patterns of onset, worsening, treatment failure, and recovery.

The key here is to understand the TS patterns of the phenotypes of each infection type before launching another blind “sepsis” RCT. These can be analyzed by disease (e Coli urosepsis), by organism, or by diagnosis (bowel perforation).

So you don’t begin with a “heterogeneous syndrome” as a set of different diseases triaged by SIRS or SOFA or some other taskforce guessed thresholds which are going to be changed in a few years but instead with objective patient relational TS signals because that is real data. Data derived from guessed thresholds are ephemeral artifacts.

Objective TS data and patterns provide a basis for objective study which can be built upon. They will be the same 10 and 100 years from now. Work based on guessed threshold sets cannot. For example 25 years of old SIRS studies are worthless but that’s not how science is supposed to work. You should be able to build in the old research.

Of course a taskforce guess agnostic approach might prevent you from getting the grant as they cited against us for not using SoFA. (If that is “repetitive” you have 30 years of repetitive task-force meetings to blame for that.)

The point is you first fully characterize the target disease and target TS patterns as was accomplished, for example, with IPF and THEN target that disease or a common objective thread in a group of diseases.

After that and when efficacy is identified for that target then search for the target and expand outward as was the approach with PPF. Starting broad and blind dilutes the signal. You might get lucky but that’s not fair to the participants who are taking the risk and probably never told these studies virtually always are non reproducible. The risk benefit for that type of research is too low. For example, it would probably never have worked to broadly target PPF in a RCT of anti fibrotics the first instance.

There are many options for RCT once the diseases and the phenotypic TS patterns are understood. You can figure that out. There are only blind stabs in the dark as we have seen for decades when each study begins with the announcement that they are studying a “heterogenous syndrome” (given that no one even knows what a heterogenous syndrome is).

REMAP CAP showed the value of DAGs. Is your argument that this finding of the DAGs was known and they did this massive study anyway? That’s unlikely.

Did you know that the disparate safety net of antibiotics vs antivirals could alter the ATE of treatment of a lumped set unpredictable ways? You probably did not know that and neither did those designing the RCT but the DAG shows it. Arguing against formal symbolic causal modeling, when there are human participants at risk, makes no sense to me.

However the point of this thread was to tell the dark truth about the state of critical care science. That you say I’m repetitive as everyone knows this truth. Well great. I would like to see just one reference which identifies triage for RCT participants using a 1996 guessed set of thresholds as a pathological science. Hey, I’ll even accept a reference which identifies it as a limitation of the RCT. And no, a euphemistic statement about raw “heterogeneity” is not a disclosure.

So I’ve said enough. I honestly never expected anyone here to acknowledge the PettyBone RCT mimic methodology is pathological science. You can’t.

It’s not up to me to fix it. It’s progress that “everyone knows” of the PettyBone pitfall even if they won’t admit that in formal publication because in the past they argued with me in -2012 that SIRS was fundamental to sepsis RCT science and blocked me for opposing it.

One final note before I go and thanks to all that participated. I will end my time at Datamethods with thanks. However: we are all at the beside and,
It is important to point out that:

a perceived lack of an alternative is not license to knowingly practice and promulgate, as a standard, pathological science.