Let’s see, I wrote this: " ‘A single p-value doesn’t mean anything’ is false if taken literally, and embodies a confusion I find prevalent among P-values critics who fail to distinguish math objects from their various interpretations."
-that makes no mention of you personally; my sentence’s topic was instead the quoted statement and noted a general confusion the statement invites. I then explained what I meant at painstaking length. To which you replied that my explanation (which encapsulates published material) did “lengthily show off how clever we are without ever trying to find out what the other person actually means” - that’s just nasty in a direct personal way, especially when it would have sufficed to explain how I missed your intended meaning.
Regardless, you really ought to try and understand the math and logic of a criticism before you go off on the source challenging your claims. And you really ought to go back and read the literature to see how the issues you raise have been raised repeatedly and debated at length for at least a half century, without convincing any of us to become converts to falsificationism, refutationism, or whatever you want to call the philosophy you promote, even though we all agree it can be a useful perspective at times and has some wisdom worth noting. For just a small sample from epidemiology see
Buck C. Popper’s philosophy for epidemiologists. Int J Epidemiol 1975;4:159–168
Jacobsen M. Against Popperized epidemiology. Int J Epidemiol 1976;5:9–11.
Maclure M. Popperian refutation in epidemiology. Am J Epidemiol 1985;121:343–50.
Susser M. The logic of Sir Karl Popper and the practice of epidemiology. American Journal of Epidemiology 1986;124:711-718.
Eells E. On the alleged impossibility of inductive probability. Br J Phil Sci 1988;39:111–16.
Greenland S. Probability versus Popper: An elaboration of the insufficiency of current Popperian approaches for epidemiologic analysis. In: Rothman KJ (ed.). Causal Inference. Chestnut Hill, MA: ERI, 1988.
Susser M. Falsification, verification and causal inference in epidemiology: reconsideration in light of Sir Karl Popper’s philosophy. In: Rothman KJ (ed.). Causal Inference. Chestnut Hill, MA: ERI, 1988, 33-58.
Pearce N, Crawford-Brown D. Critical discussion in epidemiology: problems with the Popperian approach. J Clin Epidemiol 1989;42(3):177-84.
Karhausen LR. The poverty of Popperian epidemiology. Int J Epidemiol 1995;24:869–74.
as well as the Papineau article that Pedro cited,
and the two articles of mine I cited on Twitter:
Greenland S. Induction versus Popper: substance versus semantics. Int J Epidemiol 1998;27:543–548.
Greenland S. Probability logic and probabilistic induction. Epidemiology 1998;9:322–332.
The 1989 Pearce+Crawford-Brown article sums up the position of the unconvinced thusly: "The recent Popperian ‘trend’ has a positive aspect in that it has fostered deductive thinking, and exposed the shortcomings of induction. However, the restrictive Popperian framework actually inhibits discussion despite its veneer of ‘critical discussion’ ”. Indeed; a third of a century later it remains so, and it is remarkable how those who rally under the ideals of Popper have often done so by pairing the stated goal of critical rationalism with contemptuous dismissal of any criticism that is not framed and easily addressed in their terms.